Описание: Part I Motivation and Framework
1 Introduction
1.1 Cyber-Physical Systems and Smart Cities
1.2 New Challenges in CPS
1.3 Overview and Related Works
1.4 Outline of the book
2 Cross-Layer Framework for CPSs
2.1 Introduction to Cross-Layer Design
2.2 Cross-Layer Design: Connecting Cryptography and Control Theory
2.3 Cross-Layer Design: Connecting Game Theory with Control Theory
2.4 Cross-Layer Design under Incomplete Information
2.5 Conclusions Part II Secure Outsourcing Computations of CPS
3 New Architecture: Cloud-Enabled CPS
3.1 Promising Applications of CE-CPSs
3.1.1 Cloud-Enabled Robotics
3.1.2 Cloud-Enabled Smart Grids
3.1.3 Cloud-Enabled Transport Systems
3.1.4 Cloud-Enabled Manufacturing
3.2 New Security Requirements of CE-CPSs
3.3 Conclusion
4 Secure and Resilient Design of Could-Enabled CPS
4.1 New Challenges and Proposed Solutions of CE-CPS
4.2 Problem Statements
4.3 System Dynamics and MPC Algorithm
4.4 The Standard form of Quadratic Problem
4.4.1 Cloud Attack Models 4.4.2 The Framework of the proposed mechanism
4.5 Confidentiality and Integrity
4.5.1 Encryption Methods
4.5.2 Verification Methods
4.6 Availability Issues
4.6.1 Switching Mode Mechanism
4.6.2 Buffer Mode and Switching Condition
4.6.3 The Local Controller for the Safe Mode
4 4.7 Analysis and Experiments
4.8 Conclusions and Notes
5 Secure Data Assimilation of Cloud Sensor Networks
5.1 Introduction to CE-LSNs
5.2 Problem Formulation
5.2.1 System Model and the Outsourcing Kalman Filter
5.2.2 Challenges and Design Objectives
5.3 The Secure Outsourcing Data Assimilation
5.3.1 The Additive Homomorphic Encryption
5.3.2 The Homomorphic Observer
5.3.3 Customized Encryption for Outsourcing Computation 5.4 Analysis of the Efficiency and Security
5.4.1 Efficiency Analysis
5.4.2 Security Analysis
5.5 Analysis of Quantization Errors
5.6 Experimental Results
5.6.1 The Output of the Encrypted Information
5.6.2 The Impact of the Quantization Errors
5.7 Conclusions and Notes
Part III Game-Theoretic Approach for CPS
6 Review of Game Theory
6.1 Introduction to Game Theory
6.2 Two-Person Zero-Sum Game Model
6.2.1 Formulation of the Zero-sum Game
6.3 Stackelberg Game Model
6.3.1 Formulation of the Stackelberg Game
6.3.2 Security Design based on Stackelberg Game
6.4 FlipIt Game Model
6.4.1 Formulation of FlipIt Game
6.4.2 Analysis of the FlipIt Game 6.5 Signaling Game with Evidence
6.6 Conclusion and Notes70
7 A Game-Theoretic Approach to Secure Control of 3D Printers
7.1 New Challenges in Networked 3D Printers
7.2 Problem Formulation
7.2.1 The Dynamic Model of 3D Printing Systems
7.2.2 Physical Zero-Sum Game Framework
7.2.3 A Cyber-Physical Attack Model for 3D-printing Systems
7.2.4 The Cyber FlipIt Game Model
7.2.5 A Cyber-physical Stackelberg Game Model
7.3 Analysis of the Cyber-Physical Games 7.3.1 Analysis of the Physical Zero-Sum Game Equilibrium
7.3.2 Analysis of the Cyber FlipIt Game Equilibrium
7.3.3 Analysis of the Cyber-Physical Stackelberg Game Equilibrium
7.4 Numerical Results
7.5 Conclusion and Notes
8 A Game Framework to Secure Control of CBTC Systems
8.1 Introduction to CBTC systems 8.2 Problem Formulation
8.2.1 The Physical Model of a Train System
8.2.2 Communication Model and Attack Model
8.3 Estimation Approach and Security Criterion
8.3.1 Physical Estimation Problem
